Advice for Non-analytical Naturalists

In Martina Herrmann (ed.), Reading Parfit. Springer Netherlands. pp. 153-171 (1998)
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Abstract

We argue that Parfit's "Triviality Objection" against some naturalistic views of normativity is not compelling. We think that once one accepts, as one should, that identity statements can be informative in virtue of their pragmatics and not only in virtue of their semantics, Parfit's case against naturalism can be overcome.

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David Sobel
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms.Pekka Väyrynen - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (3):505-530.
Scanlon’s modal metaphysics.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):856-876.
The Normative Property Dualism Argument.Jesse Hambly - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.

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