A priori entailment and conceptual analysis: Making room for type-c physicalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):93 – 111 (2008)
Abstract
One strategy for blocking Chalmers's overall case against physicalism has been to deny his claim that showing that phenomenal properties are in some sense physical requires an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones. Here I avoid this well-trodden ground and argue instead that an a priori entailment of the phenomenal truths from the physical ones does not require an analysis in the Jackson/Chalmers sense. This is to sever the dualist's link between conceptual analysis and a priori entailment by showing that the lack of the former does not imply the absence of the latter. Moreover, given the role of the argument from conceptual analysis in Chalmers's overall case for dualism, undermining that argument effectively undermines that case as a whole in a way that, I'll argue, undermining the conceivability arguments as stand-alone arguments does not.
Keywords physicalism  conceptual analysis  zombie argument  reduction  philosophy of mind  a priori entailment  metaphysics of mind
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DOI 10.1080/00048400701846582
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA
Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Reductions.J. L. Dowell - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91-110.
How to Be a Type-C Physicalist.Adrian Boutel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.

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