Chance-lowering causes

In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge (2004)
Abstract
In this paper I reconsider a standard counterexample to the chance-raising theory of singular causation. Extant versions of this theory are so different that it is difficult to formulate the core thesis that they all share, despite the guiding idea that causes raise the chance of their effects. At one extreme, ‘Humean’ theories – which can be traced to Reichenbach – say that a particular event of type C is the cause of a particular event of type E only if P(E|C & K) > P(E|~C & K) where K is a set of background conditions and where the probabilities are interpreted as relative frequencies. At the other extreme, explicitly non-Humean theories take chance to be a physical, particular, local feature of the world.
Keywords causation  chance
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