Liar paradox

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2001)

Abstract
The Liar Paradox is an argument that arrives at a contradiction by reasoning about a Liar Sentence. The classical Liar Sentence is the self-referential sentence “This sentence is false.”
Keywords Tarski  global truth predicate  Kripke  Quine  Russell  Barwise  Etchemendy  Strengthened Liar
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Gene Networks and Liar Paradoxes.Mark Isalan - 2009 - Bioessays 31 (10):1110-1115.
The Liar Paradox in Plato.Richard McDonough - 2015 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy (1):9-28.

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