Nietzsche on the possibility of truth and knowledge

Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 9 (1) (2005)
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This paper examines Nietzsche’s views on truth and knowledge in the context of both his rejection of the Kantian thing-in-itself and his perspectivism. It is argued that Nietzsche’s principal contention with the thing-in-itself centres round the dissociation of truth and justification. The paper argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism, understood as an epistemic thesis, sows the seeds for the overcoming of this sceptical dissociation.



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Tsarina Doyle
National University of Ireland, Galway

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References found in this work

Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy.Maudemarie Clark - 1990 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Unnatural Doubts.Michael Williams - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):533-547.
The method of truth in metaphysics.Donald Davidson - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):244-254.
Nietzsche and metaphysics.Peter Poellner - 1995 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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