The evidential relevance of self-locating information

Philosophical Studies 166 (1):185-202 (2013)
Abstract
Philosophical interest in the role of self-locating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is 1/3, various attractive views on confirmation and probabilistic reasoning appear to be undermined; and some writers have used the problem as a basis for rejecting some of those views. My interest here is in two such views. One of them is the thesis that self-locating information cannot be evidentially relevant to a non-self-locating hypothesis. The other, a basic tenet of Bayesian confirmation theory, is the thesis that an ideally rational agent updates her credence in a non-self-locating hypothesis in response to new information only by conditionalization. I argue that we can disprove these two theses by way of cases that are much less puzzling than Sleeping Beauty. I present two such cases in this paper
Keywords Sleeping Beauty problem  Self-locating belief  Conditionalization
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0033-2
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References found in this work BETA
Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.
Beauty and the Bets.Christopher Hitchcock - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):405 - 420.
The Theory of Probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley: University of California Press.

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