Abstract

Contemporary Hobbesians attempt to develop moral principles and normative political principles as principles of rational self-interest. In this dissertation, I consider the two most promising contemporary efforts to articulate Hobbesian theory, those offered by David Gauthier and Jean Hampton. And I argue that both of these efforts fail to yield acceptable moral or normative political principles. While Hobbesian theory appears to fail as a source of acceptable moral or normative political principles, I suggest that Hobbesian theory can be developed into a "meta-ethical" theory, a theory about the significance and role in social life of moral and normative political claims. ;In his recent book, Morals by Agreement, Gauthier argues that rational self-interest leads to compliance with moral norms defined by an hypothetical agreement. Unfortunately, Gauthier's argument fails. Even on Gauthier's own terms, it turns out not to be universally rational to adopt the disposition which leads to compliance with moral norms. Further, given plausible assumptions about the nature of dispositions, there will actually be a disadvantage to adopting the disposition Gauthier recommends. And finally, there is not a unique hypothetical agreement defining moral norms which all individuals are rational to accept as Gauthier argues and as is presupposed by Gauthier's compliance argument. ;In her recent book, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Hampton maintains that Hobbesian individuals can and should create a ruler who is their agent. While I think Hampton's account of Hobbesian theory is, in it's broad outlines, correct, her account needs refinement at several key points. The most important consequence of these refinements is that it is not an entire population which sets standards for the ruler-agent, but only a subset, the members of which are arbitrarily selected. The result is that, to the extent that a ruler does not wield power and serve her own interests, an arbitrarily selected subset of the population wields power and serves its members' interests. This leads to the conclusion that the principles of rational self-interest Hampton develops are unacceptable as substantive moral or normative political principles. ;I suggest that Hobbesians have been mistaken to identify moral and normative political claims with reports of rational self-interest or, for that matter, with reports of objective truths of any sort. Rather, I suggest that the primary role of such claims is to indicate the acceptance of a principle as the object of a present or prospective convention. This account of moral and normative political claims builds on the Hobbesian account of moral and political conventions and reflects the practical interests that Hobbesian individuals have in building and maintaining conventions. The theory I end up with is a non-cognitive meta-ethical theory which I call Hobbesian Non-Cognitivism.