Authors
Hubert Dreyfus
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
We argue that heterophenomenology both over- and under-populates the intentional realm. For example, when one is involved in coping, one’s mind does not contain beliefs. Since the heterophenomenologist interprets all intentional commitment as belief, he necessarily overgenerates the belief contents of the mind. Since beliefs cannot capture the normative aspect of coping and perceiving, any method, such as heterophenomenology, that allows for only beliefs is guaranteed not only to overgenerate beliefs but also to undergenerate other kinds of intentional phenomena
Keywords heterophenomenology  coping skills  belief  intentionality
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9042-y
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References found in this work BETA

Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.

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Citations of this work BETA

Affordances and the Musically Extended Mind.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:1-12.

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