Internalism and speaker relativism

Ethics 101 (1):6-26 (1990)

James Dreier
Brown University
In this article I set out a reason for believing in a form of metaethical relativism. In rough terms, the reason is this: a widely held thesis, internalism, tells us that to accept (sincerely assert, believe, etc.) a moral judgment logically requires having a motivating reason. Since the connection is logical, or conceptual, it must be explained by a theory of what it is to accept a moral claim. I argue that the internalist feature of moral expressions can best be explained by my version of moral relativism, which I call "speaker relativism.".
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DOI 10.1086/293257
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