In mediis rebus

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):441 – 447 (1994)
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Abstract

For Quine all talk is in mediis rebus, is itself a physical phenomenon. To grasp what a sentence is, its relation to a language, and what it is for a sentence to be true is to be invited to see that notions of shared meaning across languages, of truth, even of knowledge, are far from what they are ordinarily taken to be. To read Quine reflectively is to plunge with him into the midst of things, shunning the vain support of purported transcendental certainties or Archimedean points, and spurning claims of the intuitive clarity of meaning, thought, and belief, for in the midst of things they themselves are what are most lacking in clarity

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Citations of this work

Verificationism and (Some of) its Discontents.Thomas Uebel - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (4):1-31.
Carnapian rationality.A. W. Carus - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):163-184.
On Making Sense of Recipes.Craig Fox - 2020 - Humana Mente 13 (38).

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References found in this work

Steps toward a constructive nominalism.Nelson Goodman & Willard van Orman Quine - 1947 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):105-122.
Putnam, Quine - and the Facts.Burton Dreben - 1992 - Philosophical Topics 20 (1):293-315.

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