Lockean and logical truth conditions

Analysis 64 (1):84-91 (2004)

Authors
James Dreier
Brown University
Abstract
1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expressivism (and not non-cognitivism), but rather a version of cognitivism. According to (what we’ll call) Subjectivism, a typical ethical sentence like ‘Abortion is wrong’ reports the speaker’s non-cognitive attitude toward abortion; it says, in effect, that abortion is the object of some attitude of the speaker’s. Expressivists, by contrast, say that the sentence expresses a non-cognitive attitude toward abortion, but does not say that the speaker has it. Ayer put it this way: I can say that I am bored by uttering the sentence ‘I am bored’, but I can express boredom, without saying that I am bored, by yawning (Ayer 1952: 109).
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DOI 10.1093/analys/64.1.84
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References found in this work BETA

Transforming Expressivism.James Dreier - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):558-572.
Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd edition.A. J. Ayer - 1952 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142:256-256.
A Problem for Expressivism.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):239–251.

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Citations of this work BETA

Expression for Expressivists.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86–116.
Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):538-556.
Expression for Expressivists.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86-116.
Divine Hoorays: Some Parallels Between Expressivism and Religious Ethics.Nicholas Unwin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):659-684.
Divine Hoorays: Some Parallels Between Expressivism and Religious Ethics.Nicholas Unwin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):659-684.

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