Meta‐ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism

Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44 (2004)
Abstract
This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00019.x
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References found in this work BETA
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Four Faces of Moral Realism.Stephen Finlay - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):820-849.
Against Quietist Normative Realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
Epistemology Without Metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
A Semantic Challenge to Non-Realist Cognitivism.David Copp - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):569-591.
Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):334 - 358.

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