Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44 (2004)

Authors
James Dreier
Brown University
Abstract
This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
Keywords Ethics   Realism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00019.x
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.
Against Quietist Normative Realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.
Epistemology Without Metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
Moral Anti-Realism.Richard Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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