Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220 (1971)

Authors
Abstract
Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only satisfactory explanation of this fact is that when one knows that P is true, the reasons or evidence one has in support of P are such as to confer upon P the probability of 1. It is shown by an application of Bayes' Theorem that any value smaller than 1 would permit having reasons to believe what one knows to be false. Hence, it would seem that knowledge requires conclusive reasons to believe (if reasons or evidence is required at all)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/288355
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,363
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Akrasia.David Owens - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):381-397.
What is Testimony?Peter J. Graham - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):227-232.
Disclaiming Epistemic Akrasia: Arguments and Commentaries.Veronica S. Campos - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
125 ( #84,261 of 2,445,443 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #232,475 of 2,445,443 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes