Res Philosophica 97 (3):345-362 (2020)

James Dreier
Brown University
The consequentializing project relies on agentcentered value, but many philosophers find the idea incomprehensible or incoherent. Discussions of agent-centered value often model it with a theory that assigns distinct better-than rankings of states of affairs to each agent, rather than assigning a single ranking common to all. A less popular kind of model uses a single ranking, but takes the value-bearing objects to be properties rather than states of affairs. There are rhetorical, presentational differences between these kinds of models, but are there also structural differences? Do the two kinds of models differ in their capacity to represent normative theories? Despite an initial appearance of equivalence, the two kinds of models are different. The single ranking of properties has greater representational power; its representations contain more information. The main question I address in this article is whether this extra information is useful, in the sense that it distinguishes between normative views that we think are really different, or whether it is just junk information.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  History of Philosophy
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.11612/resphil.1971
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,192
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Frege on Demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
Thank Goodness That's Over.A. N. Prior - 1959 - Philosophy 34 (128):12 - 17.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Consequentialists Must Kill.Christopher Howard - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):727-753.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Taking Seriously the Challenges of Agent-Centered Morality.Hye-Ryoung Kang - 2011 - JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL WONKWANG CULTURE 2 (1):43-56.
Epistemological Egoism and Agent-Centered Norms.Michael Huemer - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. pp. 17.
Modeling Human Experience?!Fred A. Keijzer - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):239 – 245.
Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.
Agent-Based Modeling and the Fallacies of Individualism.Brian Epstein - 2011 - In Paul Humphreys & Cyrille Imbert (eds.), Models, Simulations, and Representations. Routledge. pp. 115444.


Added to PP index

Total views
54 ( #210,288 of 2,507,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #119,082 of 2,507,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes