Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230 (2003)
I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they can rationalize actions because, like perception, they have a representational intentional content. Because of this, an emotion can non-inferentially justify a belief which in its turn justifies or rationalizes an action; so emotions may constitute a source of moral knowledge
|Keywords||Action Belief Desire Emotion Ethics Goldie, P|
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References found in this work BETA
What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.E. Griffiths Paul - 1997 - University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.
Aptness of Emotions for Fictions and Imaginings.Jonathan Gilmore - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):468-489.
The Nature of Epistemic Feelings.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
Emotion Recognition as Pattern Recognition: The Relevance of Perception.Albert Newen, Anna Welpinghus & Georg Juckel - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (2):187-208.
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