In M. Dries (ed.), Nietzsche on Time and History. Walter de Gruyter (2008)

Authors
Manuel Dries
Open University (UK)
Abstract
For Nietzsche’s hypothesis of a threat of nihilism to be intelligible, this chapter attributes to him at least three assumptions that underpin his philosophical project: (1) what there is, is becoming (and not being), (2) most (if not all) strongly believe in being, and (3) nihilism is a function of the belief in being. This chapter argues that Nietzsche held two doctrines of becoming: one more radical, which he believes is required to fend off nihilism, and one much more moderate—the ontology of relations he develops under the label ‘will to power’. Based on the latter he attempts (but ultimately fails) to develop an ‘adualistic’—neither monistic nor dualistic—practice of thought, a ‘simultaneity-thinking’ ("Zugleich-Denken") that would no longer be subject to nihilism.
Keywords Friedrich Nietzsche  Philosophy of Time  Philosophical Nihilism  Becoming  Post-Kantian European Philosophy
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DOI 10.1515/9783110210460.2.113
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