Why bayesian psychology is incomplete

Philosophy of Science 66 (3):389 (1999)
Abstract
Bayesian psychology, in what is perhaps its most familiar version, is incomplete: Jeffrey conditionalization is not a complete account of rational belief change. Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence arrives. This order effect can be so pronounced as to call for a belief adjustment that cannot be understood as an assimilation of incoming evidence by Jeffrey's rule. Hartry Field's reparameterization of Jeffrey's rule avoids the order effect but fails as an account of how new evidence should be assimilated
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DOI 10.1086/392739
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Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence.James Hawthorne - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.

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