Changes in attitude

Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):151-169 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I formulate and tentatively defend the view that we cannot be rationally required to have one type of doxastic attitude (e.g., beliefs, credences, imprecise credences, etc.) because we have another type; in other words, we can only be required to have, say, given credences because we have some other credences already. I explore an argument that appeals to the idea that there is no good reasoning from one type to the other type. I consider some important possible responses, and conclude by sketching a different argument for the same conclusion, appealing to the nature of inquiry and belief-formation.

Similar books and articles

A model of dual attitudes.Timothy D. Wilson, Samuel Lindsey & Tonya Y. Schooler - 2000 - Psychological Review 107 (1):101-126.
When and why is it disrespectful to excuse an attitude?John W. Robison - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2391-2409.
A Dispositional Approach to the Attitudes.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - In N. Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief. Palgrave. pp. 75-99.
Afterword: Aude Describere!D. R. Koukal - 2008 - PhaenEx 3 (2):179-194.
The Manifestation Account of Evil.Philipp Schwind & Felix Timmermann - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3):401-418.
Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude.Sebastian Luft - 1998 - Continental Philosophy Review 31 (2):153-170.
‘Playing sport playfully’: on the playful attitude in sport.Emily Ryall & Lukáš Mareš - 2021 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (2):293-306.
Remarks on aesthetic intentionality: Husserl or Kant.Danielle Lories - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (1):31-49.


Added to PP

111 (#117,387)

6 months
26 (#54,265)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Drucker
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references