Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality

This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “ phenomenology ”: a narrow sense and a broader sense. It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of “ phenomenology ” serves to provide a more precise sense of what we might mean by “ moral phenomenology.”
Keywords Phenomenology  Intentionality  Consciousness  Evaluation  Volition  Feeling  Emotion  Good  Obligation
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-007-9064-0
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References found in this work BETA
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.

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Citations of this work BETA
Joseph Lacey (2013). Moral Phenomenology and a Moral Ontology of the Human Person. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):51-73.
Jann E. Schlimme (2013). Is Acting on Delusions Autonomous? Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 8 (1):14.

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