Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):28-44 (2007)
This paper attempts to clarify how one might understand philosophy as necessarily involving both third-person and first-person perspectives. It argues, first, that philosophy must incorporate the first-person perspective in order to provide an adequate account of consciousness and the prereflective awareness of the self and, second, in opposition to Dennett’s hetero-phenomenology that this incorporation is possible only within a transcendental perspective. The paper also attempts to meet the challenge of those who claim that the notion of the self—and along with it, the idea of first-person perspective—is dependent upon a second-person perspecive. It argues that the second-person challenge depends upon a sense of “self ” different from that at stake in the first-person perspective operative in prereflective self-awareness
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
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References found in this work BETA
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.Edmund Husserl - 1970 - Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
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Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context.Steven Crowell - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):564-588.
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