Personal Perspectives

Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):28-44 (2007)
This paper attempts to clarify how one might understand philosophy as necessarily involving both third-person and first-person perspectives. It argues, first, that philosophy must incorporate the first-person perspective in order to provide an adequate account of consciousness and the prereflective awareness of the self and, second, in opposition to Dennett’s hetero-phenomenology that this incorporation is possible only within a transcendental perspective. The paper also attempts to meet the challenge of those who claim that the notion of the self—and along with it, the idea of first-person perspective—is dependent upon a second-person perspecive. It argues that the second-person challenge depends upon a sense of “self ” different from that at stake in the first-person perspective operative in prereflective self-awareness
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00109.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,840
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Totality and Infinity.Emmanuel Levinas - 1961/1969 - Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Why is Ethics First Philosophy? Levinas in Phenomenological Context.Steven Crowell - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):564-588.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Second-Person Perspective.Michael Pauen - 2012 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):33 - 49.
Phenomenology: Neither Auto- nor Hetero- Be. [REVIEW]John J. Drummond - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):57-74.
Crossing the Bridge: The First-Person and Time.Patrick Stokes - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):295-312.
First-Personal Aspects of Agency.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
Consciousness and the "Causal Paradox".Max Velmans - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):538-542.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

26 ( #198,378 of 2,178,237 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #112,553 of 2,178,237 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums