The Ontological Status of Bodies in Leibniz (Part I)

Studia Leibnitiana 47 (2):131-161 (2015)
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Abstract

It's well known that Leibniz characterizes bodies in two apparently incompatible ways. On the one hand, he asserts that a body is a real or well-founded phenomenon; on the other, he claims that a body is an aggregate of substances that possesses the reality of these same substances. In this essay I aim to defend an explanation of the relation that exists, according to Leibniz, between these two conceptions of body, an explanation that shows them to be compatible and, indeed, complementary. In the first part of this paper I aim above all to show that Robert Adams and Donald Rutherford are wrong to think that these two conceptions are to be reconciled by recognizing that for Leibniz they apply to one and the same thing.

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Shane Duarte
University of Notre Dame

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References found in this work

Leibniz as idealist.Donald Rutherford - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4:141-90.
Leibniz and the Problem of Monadic Aggregation.Donald Rutherford - 1994 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 76 (1):65-90.
Leibniz as Idealist.Donald Rutherford - 2008 - In Daniel Garber & Steven Nadler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy Volume Iv. Oxford University Press.

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