Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings


Authors
Richard Dub
University of Geneva
Abstract
Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their “delusional reality.” To explain these features, I offer a model according to which, contrary to appearances, delusions are not beliefs at all. Delusions are acceptances that are generated by pathologically powerful cognitive feelings. This model has implications for the way that we should think about non-pathological doxastic states and emotions.
Keywords delusion  belief  emotion  feelings  delusions  capgras  acceptance  beliefs  psychopathology  psychosis
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12220
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References found in this work BETA

Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief’s Minimal Rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
The Genuine Attitude View of Fictional Belief.Wesley Buckwalter & Katherine Tullmann - 2017 - In Bradley H., Sullivan-Bissett E. & Noordhof P. (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford University Press.

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