How Serious Is the Paradox of Serious Possibility?

Mind 121 (481):1-36 (2012)
Abstract
The so-called Paradox of Serious Possibility is usually regarded as showing that the standard axioms of belief revision do not apply to belief sets that are introspectively closed. In this article we argue to the contrary: we suggest a way of dissolving the Paradox of Serious Possibility so that introspective statements are taken to express propositions in the standard sense, which may thus be proper members of belief sets, and accordingly the normal axioms of belief revision apply to them. Instead the paradox is avoided by making explicit, for any occurrence of an introspective modality in the object language, the belief state to which this occurrence refers; this will make it impossible for any doxastic modality to refer to two distinct belief sets within one and the same context of doxastic appraisal. By this move the standard derivation of a contradiction from the theory of belief revision in the presence of introspectively closed belief sets does not go through any more, and indeed the premisses of the Paradox of Serious Possibility become jointly consistent once they are reformulated with our amended introspective modalities only. Additionally, we present a probabilistic version of the Paradox of Serious Possibility which can be avoided in a perfectly analogous manner
Keywords belief revision  Introspection  epistemic paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzs042
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,191
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance.Michael J. Shaffer - 2013 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25:337-353.
A Paraconsistent Theory of Belief Revision.Edwin D. Mares - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):229 - 246.
Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
The Paradox of Belief Instability and a Revision Theory of Belief.Byeong Lee - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):314–328.
Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox.Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
Reversing the Levi Identity.Sven Ove Hansson - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
A Moorean Paradox of Desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.
Moore's Paradox and Conscious Belief.John N. Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-10-21

Total downloads

86 ( #60,887 of 2,172,657 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #325,028 of 2,172,657 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums