Philosophy Compass 4 (6):978-986 (2009)

Authors
R. A. Duff
University of Stirling
Abstract
The paper begins with the plausible view that criminal responsibility should track moral responsibility, and explains its plausibility. A necessary distinction is then drawn between liability and answerability as two dimensions of responsibility, and is shown to underpin the distinction in criminal law between offences and defences. This enables us to distinguish strict liability from strict answerability, and to see that whilst strict criminal liability seems inconsistent with the principle that criminal responsibility should track moral responsibility, strict criminal answerability is not. We must ask, therefore, whether, when and why strict criminal responsibility is unacceptable.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00257.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,617
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Responsibility as Answerability.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):99-126.
Nobody’s Perfect: Moral Responsibility in Negligence.Ori Herstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 31 (1):109-125.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-11-26

Total views
323 ( #22,579 of 2,348,760 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #72,146 of 2,348,760 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes