Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):217-235 (2014)
AbstractAfter distinguishing different species of Legal Moralism I outline and defend a modest, positive Legal Moralism, according to which we have good reason to criminalize some type of conduct if it constitutes a public wrong. Some of the central elements of the argument will be: the need to remember that the criminal law is a political, not a moral practice, and therefore that in asking what kinds of conduct we have good reason to criminalize, we must begin not with the entire realm of wrongdoing, but with conduct falling within the public realm of our civic life; the need to look at the different processes of criminalization, and to ask what kinds of consideration can properly figure in those processes; the need to attend to the relationship, and the essential differences, between criminal law and other modes of legal regulation
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.Philip Pettit (ed.) - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law.Victor Tadros - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.Philip Pettit - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):415-419.
Citations of this work
Why Trolley Problems Matter for the Ethics of Automated Vehicles.Geoff Keeling - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (1):293-307.
Criminalization of Scientific Misconduct.William Bülow & Gert Helgesson - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (2):245-252.
Moral Subversion and Structural Entrapment.Jeffrey W. Howard - 2016 - Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (1):24-46.
Punishing the Oppressed and the Standing to Blame.Andy Engen - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (2):271-295.
Retributivists! The Harm Principle Is Not for You!Patrick Tomlin - 2014 - Ethics 124 (2):272-298.
Similar books and articles
New Legal Moralism: Some Strengths and Challenges.Thomas Søbirk Petersen - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):215-232.
Towards a Modest Legal Moralism: Concept, Open Questions, and Potential Extension. [REVIEW]F. Meyer - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):237-244.
Legal Paternalism and Legal Moralism: Devlin, Hart and Ten.Heta Häyry - 1992 - Ratio Juris 5 (2):191-201.
Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited.Jeffrie G. Murphy - 2007 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1):5-20.
Boxing, Paternalism, and Legal Moralism.Nicholas Dixon - 2001 - Social Theory and Practice 27 (2):323-344.