Towards a Modest Legal Moralism

Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):217-235 (2014)

Abstract

After distinguishing different species of Legal Moralism I outline and defend a modest, positive Legal Moralism, according to which we have good reason to criminalize some type of conduct if it constitutes a public wrong. Some of the central elements of the argument will be: the need to remember that the criminal law is a political, not a moral practice, and therefore that in asking what kinds of conduct we have good reason to criminalize, we must begin not with the entire realm of wrongdoing, but with conduct falling within the public realm of our civic life; the need to look at the different processes of criminalization, and to ask what kinds of consideration can properly figure in those processes; the need to attend to the relationship, and the essential differences, between criminal law and other modes of legal regulation

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,879

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-10-18

Downloads
180 (#67,359)

6 months
6 (#116,803)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

R. A. Duff
University of Stirling

References found in this work

Harm to Others.Joel Feinberg - 1987 - Oxford University Press USA.
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.Philip Pettit - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):415-419.
The Expressive Function of Punishment.Joel Feinberg - 1965 - The Monist 49 (3):397-423.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Why Trolley Problems Matter for the Ethics of Automated Vehicles.Geoff Keeling - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (1):293-307.
Criminalization of Scientific Misconduct.William Bülow & Gert Helgesson - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (2):245-252.
Moral Subversion and Structural Entrapment.Jeffrey W. Howard - 2016 - Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (1):24-46.
Punishing the Oppressed and the Standing to Blame.Andy Engen - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (2):271-295.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

New Legal Moralism: Some Strengths and Challenges.Thomas Søbirk Petersen - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):215-232.
Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited.Jeffrie G. Murphy - 2007 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1):5-20.
How Not to Defend Response Moralism. Smuts - 2015 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 49 (4):19-38.
Legal Moralism Reconsidered.Carl F. Cranor - 1979 - Ethics 89 (2):147-164.
The Justification of Legal Moralism.John Kultgen - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):123-131.
Retributivism and Legal Moralism.David O. Brink - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (4):496-512.
Moderate Moralism.Noël Carroll - 1996 - British Journal of Aesthetics 36 (3):223-238.
Boxing, Paternalism, and Legal Moralism.Nicholas Dixon - 2001 - Social Theory and Practice 27 (2):323-344.
Limited Legal Moralism.Richard Francis Galvin - 1988 - Criminal Justice Ethics 7 (2):23-36.