Synthese 52 (1):145--165 (1982)

Realism concerning a given subject-matter is characterised as a semantic doctrine with metaphysical consequences, namely as the adoption, for the relevant class of statements, of a truth-conditional theory of meaning resting upon the classical two-valued semantics. it is argued that any departure from classical semantics may, though will not necessarily, be seen as in conflict with some variety of realism. a sharp distinction is drawn between the rejection of realism and the acceptance of a reductionist thesis; though intimately related, neither entails the other. realism is to be classified as "naive", "semi-naive" or "sophisticated": the first of these involves an all but unintelligible epistemological component
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00485255
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,049
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Émotions et Valeurs.C. Tappolet - 2000 - Presses Universitaires de France.
Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo-Logicism.Fraser MacBride - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):103-163.
On Behalf of a Mutable Future.Patrick Todd - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2077-2095.

View all 65 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
736 ( #4,168 of 2,260,175 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
41 ( #18,295 of 2,260,175 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature