Speculum 64 (3):579-599 (1989)

Authors
Stephen Dumont
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
By all accounts one of the most influential philosophical contributions of Duns Scotus is his distinction between intuitive cognition, in which a thing is known as present and existing, and abstractive cognition, which abstracts from actual presence and existence. Recent scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the role given intuitive cognition in the justification of contingent propositions and on the debates over certitude which arose from the critiques of Scotus's distinction by Peter Aureoli and William of Ockham
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DOI 10.2307/2854184
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Peter Auriol.Russell L. Friedman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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