A new argument for the phenomenal approach to personal persistence

Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2031-2049 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When it comes to personal identity, two approaches have long ruled the roost. The first is the psychological approach, which has it that our persistence through time consists in the continuance of certain of our psychological traits, such as our memories, beliefs, desires, or personality. The second is the biological approach, according to which personal persistence consists in continuity in our physical or biological makeup. Amid the bipartite reign of these approaches, a third contender has emerged: the phenomenal approach. On this approach, personal persistence consists in continuity in phenomenal consciousness or the capacity for phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I will introduce and defend a new argument for the phenomenal approach. In the process, I will argue against the psychological and biological approaches. I will also address some lingering questions and outline further ways to develop the phenomenal approach.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

A Psycho-Phenomenal Account of the Self.Jane Loo - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3-4):127-148.
Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence.Barry Dainton & Tim Bayne - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.
Towards an Animalist Conception of Personal Identity.Keith Hess - 2017 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
Persistence Without Personhood: A New Model.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):346-364.
Personal identity and the past.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):9-22.
The phenomenal self.Barry Dainton - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-05-07

Downloads
766 (#25,068)

6 months
227 (#15,089)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matt Duncan
Rhode Island College

References found in this work

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.

View all 48 references / Add more references