Philosophical Studies 112 (3):279 - 290 (2003)

Authors
Craig Duncan
Ithaca College
Abstract
Alan Hájek has recently argued that certain assignments of vague probability defeat Pascals Wager. In particular, he argues that skeptical agnostics – those whose probability for God''s existence is vague over an interval containing zero – have nothing to fear from Pascal. In this paper, I make two arguments against Hájek: (1) that skeptical agnosticism is a form of dogmatism, and as such should be rejected; (2) that in any case, choice situations with vague probability assignments ought to be treated as second-order cases of choice under uncertainty, with the result that belief in God is the favored option in a very wide range of cases.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2004
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DOI 10.1023/A:1023082800260
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References found in this work BETA

Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 182 (3):327-329.
Agnosticism Meets Bayesianism.Alan Hájek - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):199–206.
On Rescher on Pascal's Wager.Graham Oppy - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):159 - 168.

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On Rescher on Pascal's Wager.Graham Oppy - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (3):159 - 168.
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