Moral and epistemic luck

Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. It is further claimed that once one offers a more developed notion of luck and disambiguates the problem of moral luck from the problem of epistemic luck (especially in its sceptical guise), neither of these papers is able to offer unambiguous grounds for thinking that there is a problem of moral luck. Indeed, it is shown that in so far as these papers succeed in making a prima facie case for the existence of epistemic luck, it is only the familiar sceptical variant of this problem that they identify.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Theoria 73 (2):173-178.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
Moral and epistemic luck.Daniel Statman - 1991 - Ratio 4 (2):146-156.
Postscript: Moral Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - In Epistemic Luck. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
A problem for moral luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.
Scepticism and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - In Epistemic Luck. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Moral Luck and the Professions.Jeffrey Whitman - 2008 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 27 (1-4):35-54.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
237 (#89,844)

6 months
22 (#158,850)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.
The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
Moral Luck.Dana K. Nelkin - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge, Action, Defeasibility.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perspectives and Good Dispositions.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 39 references / Add more references