Philosophical Studies 139 (3):367-393 (2008)
Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Mark Johnston [(2004). Philosophical Studies, 120, 113–183] offers a non-disjunctive version of direct realism in its place and gives a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination. I will attempt to clarify the view that he presents and then argue that, once clarified, it either does not escape the problem of hallucination or does not look much like direct realism.
|Keywords||Direct realism Hallucination Perception|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Naïve Realism Without Disjunctivism About Experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
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