European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):66-81 (2018)

Authors
Matt Duncan
Rhode Island College
Abstract
Many people believe that the mind is an epistemic refuge of sorts. The idea is that when it comes to certain core mental states, one’s being in such a state automatically puts one in a position to know that one is in that state. This idea has come under attack in recent years. One particularly influential attack comes from Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that there is no central core of states or conditions—mental or otherwise—to which we are guaranteed epistemic access. In Williamson’s words, we are cognitively homeless. In this paper I will argue that Williamson’s argument for the conclusion that we are cognitively homeless fails. Then I will show that there is a class of phenomenal states that constitutes a substantial cognitive refuge. When all is said and done, I will have both defended and shed light on our cognitive home.
Keywords Self-knowledge  Luminosity  introspection  phenomenal concepts
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Reprint years 2016, 2018
DOI 10.1111/ejop.12188
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References found in this work BETA

The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

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Citations of this work BETA

Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
Luminosity in the Stream of Consciousness.David Jenkins - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1549-1562.
Some Problems with the Anti‐Luminosity‐Argument.Wim Vanrie - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):538-559.

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