What is orientation in judgment?: an essay on Kant’s theory of Urteilskraft

Dissertation, Mcgill University (2020)
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Abstract

In this thesis I provide an account of the faculty of the mind that Kant calls ‘the power of judgment’ [Urteilskraft]. While there is an abundance of literature on various aspects of Kant’s theory of judgment in the Critical philosophy, there has been no sustained treatment of the nature of the faculty that is the subject of the third Critique (1790). I argue that the power of judgment is a fundamentally reflective, affective, and orientational capacity that occupies a central place within Kant’s account of the human mind. To this end, I trace the development of Kant’s thinking on judgment—from the pre-Critical to the Critical period, as well as from the first to the third Critique—to show how it continues to gain prominence within Kant’s taxonomy of the mind.

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Nicholas Dunn
Okanagan University College

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