The concept of truth in Husserl's Logical Investigations

Abstract
It is stated that husserl's theory of truth is ambiguous. When husserl attacked psychological interpretations of truth, A logicism seemed to be predominant; later he inclined toward intuitionism, Where truth is constituted by the real presence of the object. Purely logical relations in an eternal order of truth, Independent of things, Seems to conflict with the idea of evidence, Which is a psychological experience. It is concluded that truth is the result of an intuition in which the thing itself is given. Finally, Parallels are drawn between husserl's double truth and leibniz's truths of reason and truths of fact. (staff)
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DOI 10.2307/2104810
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