Minds and Machines 28 (4):645-666 (2018)

Juan Manuel Durán
Delft University of Technology
Several philosophical issues in connection with computer simulations rely on the assumption that results of simulations are trustworthy. Examples of these include the debate on the experimental role of computer simulations :483–496, 2009; Morrison in Philos Stud 143:33–57, 2009), the nature of computer data Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013; Humphreys, in: Durán, Arnold Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013), and the explanatory power of computer simulations :277–292, 2008; Durán in Int Stud Philos Sci 31:27–45, 2017). The aim of this article is to show that these authors are right in assuming that results of computer simulations are to be trusted when computer simulations are reliable processes. After a short reconstruction of the problem of epistemic opacity, the article elaborates extensively on computational reliabilism, a specified form of process reliabilism with computer simulations located at the center. The article ends with a discussion of four sources for computational reliabilism, namely, verification and validation, robustness analysis for computer simulations, a history of successful implementations, and the role of expert knowledge in simulations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11023-018-9481-6
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,795
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics.Peter Galison (ed.) - 1997 - University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Puzzle concerning Compositionality in Machines.Ryan M. Nefdt - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (1):47-75.
What is a Simulation Model?Juan M. Durán - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (3):301-323.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Three Kinds of Reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
Believing on Trust.Klemens Kappel - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):2009-2028.
Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification.Michael Fuerstein - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2):179-199.
Reliabilism Without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.
Skepticism, Reliabilism, and Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:139-147.
Is Epistemic Trust of Veritistic Value?Gregor Betz - 2013 - Etica E Politica 15 (2):25-41.
Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise.John Greco - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
Trust and the Curse of Cassandra.Cynthia Townley - 2003 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2):105-111.
The Nature of Epistemic Trust.Benjamin W. McCraw - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (4):413-430.


Added to PP index

Total views
29 ( #368,736 of 2,438,737 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #436,491 of 2,438,737 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes