The World's Haecceity is the Dual of My Thrownness

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Abstract
We live in a contingent world, a world that could have been different. A common way to deal with this contingency is by positing the existence of all possibilities. This, however, doesn’t get rid of the contingency – it merely moves it from the third-person view to the first-person view.
Keywords Contingency  Multiverse  Many worlds  Modal realism  Haecceity  Thrownness  Geworfenheit  Mind  precarious existence
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
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The Mathematical Universe.Max Tegmark - 2007 - Foundations of Physics 38 (2):101-150.
Firing Squads and Fine-Tuning: Sober on the Design Argument.Jonathan Weisberg - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):809-821.
'Relative State' Formulation of Quantum Mechanics.Hugh Everett - 1957 - Reviews of Modern Physics 29 (3):454-462.

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