The multiverse doesn't affect the Anthropic argument

Abstract

Often, the possibility of a multiverse is given as a defeater for the anthropic argument: if there are many, possibly even an infinite number of worlds, then the probability of having a life-permitting world is no longer low. This article shows that the possibility of a multiverse doesn’t defeat the anthropic argument.

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Likelihoods, Multiple Universes, and Epistemic Context.Lydia McGrew - 2005 - Philosophia Christi 7 (2):475 - 481.

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