Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection

Proceedings of Tark XI (2007)
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Abstract

Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge that underlies the new require- ment provides a better account of inexact knowledge and higher-order knowledge than both Williamson’s and Halpern’s.

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Julien Dutant
King's College London

Citations of this work

Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.
Metacognitive perspectives on unawareness and uncertainty.Paul Egré & Denis Bonnay - 2012 - In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 322.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Inexact knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):217-242.
The comforts of home.Earl Conee - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):444–451.
Intransitivity and vagueness.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):530-547.

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