Synthese 192 (3):635-677 (2015)

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Abstract
We demonstrate how to validly quantify into hyperintensional contexts involving non-propositional attitudes like seeking, solving, calculating, worshipping, and wanting to become. We describe and apply a typed extensional logic of hyperintensions that preserves compositionality of meaning, referential transparency and substitutivity of identicals also in hyperintensional attitude contexts. We specify and prove rules for quantifying into hyperintensional contexts. These rules presuppose a rigorous method for substituting variables into hyperintensional contexts, and the method will be described. We prove the following. First, it is always valid to quantify into hyperintensional attitude contexts and over hyperintensional entities. Second, factive empirical attitudes validate, furthermore, quantifying over intensions and extensions, and so do non-factive attitudes, both empirical and non-empirical , provided the entity to be quantified over exists. We focus mainly on mathematical attitudes, because they are uncontroversially hyperintensional
Keywords Hyperintensional context  Quantifying-in  Non-propositional attitude  Objectual attitude  Extensional logic of hyperintensions  Structured meaning  Ramified type hierarchy  Transparent Intensional Logic
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0578-z
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References found in this work BETA

What is Meaning?Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1956 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Descriptions.Stephen Neale - 1990 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Anatomy of a Proposition.Bjørn Jespersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1285-1324.
Hyperintensional Logics for Everyone.Igor Sedlár - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):933-956.
Should Propositions Proliferate?Bjørn Jespersen - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):243-251.

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