Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145 (2015)

Authors
Julien Dutant
King's College London
Abstract
There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism.
Keywords history of epistemology  analysis of knowledge  infallibilism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpe.12061
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.

View all 238 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
The Analysis of Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge Before Gettier.Pierre Le Morvan - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (6):1216-1238.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Can a Justified Belief Be False?Douglas Odegard - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):561 - 568.
Is Justified True Behavior Knowledge?.Frank Hammonds - 2010 - Behavior and Philosophy 38:49-59.
Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.
Is There a Value Problem?Jason Baehr - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 42--59.
Contextualism About Justified Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-20.
Trustworthiness.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.
Knowledge is Normal Belief.B. Ball - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):69-76.
Showing the Time.J. Biro - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):57-62.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-04-22

Total views
3,304 ( #873 of 2,454,729 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
371 ( #995 of 2,454,729 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes