The legend of the justified true belief analysis

Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145 (2015)
Abstract
There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism.
Keywords history of epistemology  analysis of knowledge  infallibilism
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DOI 10.1111/phpe.12061
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How to Be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
Knowledge Before Gettier.Pierre Le Morvan - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (6):1216-1238.

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