The legend of the justified true belief analysis

Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145 (2015)
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Abstract

There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism.

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Julien Dutant
King's College London

Citations of this work

How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):277-308.
The analysis of knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.

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