Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):572-594 (2009)
The turn from deterministic to probabilistic explanations has been used to argue that social science does not explain human action in ways that are incompatible with free will, since, according to some accounts of probabilism, causal factors merely influence actions without determining them. I argue that the notion of nondetermining causal influence is a multifaceted and problematic idea, which notably is unclear about whether the probability is objective or subjective, whether it applies to individual occurrences or merely to sets of occurrences, and whether it is possible for an occurrence to be "almost determined."
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Explanations of Meaningful Actions.C. Mantzavinos - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (2):224-238.
Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?Nicholas Maxwell - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (1):23-43.
Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible?Nicholas Maxwell - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):640-645.
Added to index2009-11-11
Total downloads16 ( #299,413 of 2,172,022 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #325,967 of 2,172,022 )
How can I increase my downloads?