Law and Philosophy 32 (4):459-483 (2013)
This paper develops a retributivist argument for leniency in punishment. It argues that even retributivists who defend desert-based punishment have a reason, internal to their view, to prefer more lenient over more severe punishments when there are doubts concerning how much punishment an offender deserves. This is because retributivists should take an asymmetrical view to underpunishment and overpunishment, and because the likelihood of overpunishment goes up with the severity of punishment. The radicalness of the ensuing leniency depends on the strength of the asymmetry in value between underpunishment and overpunishment
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Retributivist Arguments Against Capital Punishment.Thom Brooks - 2004 - Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):188–197.
Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.
The Idea of a Justification for Punishment.Kevin Magill - 1998 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1 (1):86-101.
Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism.Nathan Hanna - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.
The Failure of Trust-Based Retributivism.Daniel Z. Korman - 2003 - Law and Philosophy 22 (6):561-575.
Pre-Punishment, Communicative Theories of Punishment, and Compatibilism.Bill Wringe - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):125-136.
Added to index2012-08-22
Total downloads27 ( #187,243 of 2,158,169 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #133,785 of 2,158,169 )
How can I increase my downloads?