Theoria 20 (1):87-106 (2005)

Abstract
Tradicionalmente, las discusiones acerca del análisis correcto del concepto de justificación epistémica se han centrado en la justificación de creencias. Este artículo sugiere que hay una correlación filosóficamente interesante entre las nociones de ‘justificación epistémica’ y de ‘práctica’. Se argumenta que, con base en tres conocidos argumentos wittgensteinianos (el del regreso infinito de reglas, cl de la subdeterminación de las reglas por las regularidades observadas y contra el lenguaje privado), es posible mostrar la relevancia de las prácticas para Ja evaluación epistemica -algo que mina la utilidad dei reduccionismo tradicional para la epistemología.Traditionally the discussion concerning the correct analysis of the concept of epistemic justification has centered on the justification of beliefs. This paper suggest that there is a philosophically interesting correlation among the notions of ‘epistemic justification’ and ‘practices’. I argue that based on three well-known wittgensteinian arguments (the infinite return of rules, the subdeterminacióon of the rules by observed regularities, and against the private language) it is possible to show the relevance of practices for epistemic evaluation - something which undermines the usefulness of traditional reductionism to epistemology
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DOI theoria200520125
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References found in this work BETA

The Problem of the Criterion.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1973 - Milwaukee, Marquette University Press.
The Reality of Rule-Following.Philip Pettit - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):1-21.

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