Journal of Religious Ethics 9 (1):131 - 150 (1981)

Abstract
Part I of this essay described "Ought" and "Value" as forms of moral requiredness. Now in Part II, a description of the ideal conditions for veridical perceptions of moral requiredness are specified. This is done in the form of an ideal observer type of analysis. This analysis is defended against those who oppose naturalism by assuming a bifurcation between 'ought' and 'is' and those who accuse naturalism of a "naturalistic fallacy." It is argued that theistic versions of the ideal observer form of analysis exist in the Christian tradition in logically acceptable and plausible formulations. Specific illustrations are provided.
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