Authors
Michelle M. Dyke
New York University
Abstract
The author argues that well-known forms of relativism are unable to accommodate, at once, a set of three highly intuitive theses about the distinctive character of moral reasons. Yet the author argues it is possible to formulate a novel form of normative relativism that has the power to accommodate these claims. The proposed view combines the relativist idea that the normative facts are attitude-dependent with the insight that there are non-human agents to which it makes sense to attribute the kinds of attitudes that give rise to normative reasons. Societies, too, can possess reasons to pursue their aims. What distinguishes moral reasons from reasons of practical rationality is that the former apply directly to societies in virtue of aims held by each society as a group, while the latter apply directly to persons in light of their own individual interests.
Keywords moral relativism  realism  antirealism  normative reasons  group agency
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Language, Truth, and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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