Social Epistemology 35 (1):67-84 (2021)

Authors
Cheryl (C.E.) Abbate
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Abstract
A widely accepted view in epistemology is that we do not have direct control over our beliefs. And we surely do not have as much control over our beliefs as we have over simple actions. For instance, you can, if offered $500, immediately throw your steak in the trash, but a meat-eater cannot, at will, start believing that eating animals is wrong to secure a $500 reward. Yet, even though we have more control over our behavior than we have over our beliefs, some of our behavior, especially moral behavior, is heavily influenced by our beliefs. Meat-eating is one example. So, if we do not have direct control over our beliefs and our beliefs influence our moral behavior, it’s no wonder meat-eaters aren’t immediately boycotting Burger King and lining up for the Beyond Burger after hearing about the mistreatment of farmed animals. So, how, or can we, inspire meat-eaters to change their beliefs regarding the moral significance of meat-eating and, consequently, their animal-eating behavior? I propose an answer to this difficult question.
Keywords Meat eating  Vegetarianism  Animal ethics  epistemology  Doxastic voluntarism
Categories No categories specified
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Reprint years 2020, 2021
DOI 10.1080/02691728.2020.1771794
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References found in this work BETA

Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases.Alastair Norcross - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):229–245.
Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.James Montmarquet - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4):331-341.
Theodicy and Animal Pain.Peter Harrison - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (247):79 - 92.
Modest Deontologism in Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.
In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.

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Citations of this work BETA

Harnessing Moral Psychology to Reduce Meat Consumption.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

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