Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416 (2004)

Authors
Antony Eagle
University of Adelaide
Abstract
I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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DOI 10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6a
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Scientific Image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Deterministic Chance?Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):113-140.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Carnap on Concept Determination: Methodology for Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW]James Justus - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):161-179.
Explication Defended.Patrick Maher - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):331-341.

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