Bayes, Hume, and Miracles

Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):293-310 (1993)

John Earman
University of Pittsburgh
Recent attempts to cast Hume’s argument against miracles in a Bayesian form are examined. It is shown how the Bayesian apparatus does serve to clarify the structure and substance of Hume’s argument. But the apparatus does not underwrite Hume’s various claims, such as that no testimony serves to establish the credibility of a miracle; indeed, the Bayesian analysis reveals various conditions under which it would be reasonable to reject the more interesting of Hume’s claims
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046  
DOI 10.5840/faithphil19931039
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The Argument From Miracles.Daniel Bonevac - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3:16-40.

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