Bayes or Bust?

Bradford (1992)
Abstract
There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes's original paper to contemporary formal learning theory. In a paper published posthumously in 1763, the Reverend Thomas Bayes made a seminal contribution to the understanding of "analogical or inductive reasoning." Building on his insights, modem Bayesians have developed an account of scientific inference that has attracted numerous champions as well as numerous detractors. Earman argues that Bayesianism provides the best hope for a comprehensive and unified account of scientific inference, yet the presently available versions of Bayesianisin fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirming of scientific theories and hypotheses. By focusing on the need for a resolution to this impasse, Earman sharpens the issues on which a resolution turns. John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.
Keywords Bayes, Thomas   Bayesian statistical decision theory   Science   Inference
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ISBN(s) 0262050463  
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Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
What Are Degrees of Belief?Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Patterns of Abduction.G. Schurz - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):201-234.

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