An 'evidentialist' worry about Joyce's argument for Probabilism

Dialetica 66 (3):425-433 (2012)
Authors
Kenny Easwaran
Texas A&M University
Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University
Abstract
To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not clear whether the DBA pinpoints any epistemic defect of incoherent agents. The same can be said for Representation Theorem arguments, since they involve the structure of an agent’s preferences
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01311.x
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References found in this work BETA

A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.
A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance.David Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
Arguments for–or Against–Probabilism?A. Hajek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.

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Citations of this work BETA

When Propriety Is Improper.Kevin Blackwell & Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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